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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE UNDER
U.C.C. SECTIONS 2-201 AND 8-319
Sections 2-201(1) and 8-319(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code
provide that a contract for the sale of goods and securities is enforceable
only if it is evidenced by a writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. 1 Code sections 2-201(3) (c) and 8-319(b) recognize
an exception to this rule by providing that an oral contract is enforceable
with respect to goods or securities for which payment has been made and
accepted. 2 Several interpretative problems have recently arisen with regard
to these part-performance provisions. One problem is whether the perfor-
mance of an act or a service may be considered sufficient "payment" of the
contract "price" to render the alleged oral contract enforceable under these
provisions. Under the Uniform Sales Act, an act or a service could not consti-
tute "price" in a sale of goods.3 Thus, the performance of such acts or services
was never considered sufficient "payment" of the "price" to render the alleged
1 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) states:
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate .
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. .
U.C.C. § 8-319(a) states:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate
that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described
securities at a defined or stated price . .
(All Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text).
2 Section 2-201(3) states that "[a] contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable ... (c) with
respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted (Sec. 2-606)."
Section 8-319 states that "[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless . . . (b) delivery of the security has been accepted
or payment has been made but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to
the extent of such delivery or payment . .."
3 Uniform Sales Act § 9(2) (act withdrawn 1962) stated that "[t]he price may be
made payable in any personal property." As construed by the courts, however, the
"price" had to be paid in money or a thing of value; an act or a service to be performed
under the contract was insufficient. See, e.g., Patterson v. Beard, 227 Iowa 401, 406, 288
N.W. 414, 417 (1939); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich, 426, 433, 280
N.W. 814, 817 (1938) ; Young v. Gerosa, 11 App. Div. 2d 67, 71, 202 N.Y.S.2d 470, 476
(1960); Show of the Month, Inc. v. Shubert Theatre Corp., 202 Misc. 379, 384-85, 109
N.Y.S.2d 484, 489-90 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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oral contract enforceable.4
 Section 2-304(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
alters prior law, and provides that "[title price can be made payable in
money or otherwise.. . ." Since this section does not expand on the meaning
of the word "otherwise," it is unclear whether acts or services may constitute
"price" under the Code. Once this is resolved, a further issue arises as to
whether there are any tests applied under sections 2-201(3) (c) and 8-319(b)
which limit the acts, as performed, that may constitute "payment." One
recent case has applied a limiting test, maintaining that when an act is
required as the price, performance of the act must be "unequivocally refer-
able" to the alleged contract to bring the agreement within the scope of
section 8-319 (b ) .°
A further interpretative problem which has recently arisen is whether an
oral contract for the sale of an indivisible item is enforceable under sections
2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b) when a partial payment of the contract price
is made and accepted.° According to the Uniform Sales Act, once partial
payment was established the entire alleged contract was taken out of the
Statute of Frauds and a plaintiff was given the opportunity to prove an
agreement for a larger quantity of goods than the payment proportionately
evidenced.' Code sections 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b), however, provide that
an oral contract is enforceable with respect to goods or securities for which
payment has been made and accepted. Where the goods are apportionable to
the amount of payment, the Code clearly limits enforcement of the alleged
contract to that quantity.° Section 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b) are unclear,
however, when the part payment is made for unapportionable goods. Either
the contract is totally unenforceable, or it must be allowed for a quantity
disproportionate to the amount of the payment. Two courts have reached
contrary results on this issue.°
The purpose of this comment is to examine the correctness of these
recent Code interpretations, specifically in relation to the language and intent
of sections 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b). These interpretations will also be
analyzed in conjunction with related Code provisions as an indication of
4 Uniform Sales Act § 4(1) states that "la] contract to sell or a sale of any goods
or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be en-
forceable by action unless the buyer shall . . . give something in earnest to bind the
contract or in part payment. . . ."
5 Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 373, 269
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1966).
An indivisible or unapportionable quantity is one which, by its use and nature,
is not reasonably susceptible of division into separate parts. An example of an indivisible
quantity would be "one automobile." An example of a divisible quantity would be
"10,000 bolts." Securities may also be classified as divisible or indivisible. Thus, an
indivisible quantity of securities would be one share of stock valued at $100. A
divisible quantity would be 100 shares of stock valued at one dollar each.
7 As construed by the courts, part payment under Uniform Sales Act § 4(1)
allowed a plaintiff to prove the entire alleged contract. E.g., Phillips-Jones Co. v. Reiling
& Schoen, Inc., 193 App. Div. 716, 726-27, 184 N.Y.S.2d 387, 394 (1920); Moskewitz v.
White Bros., 166 N.Y.S. 15, 16 (App. T. 1917). See Jessup & Moore Paper Co, v.
Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 442-43, 129 A. 559, 562-63 (1925).
8 See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 2.
9 Compare Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct. 1967), with
Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (Northumberland County Ct. 1956).
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overall Uniform Commercial Code intent and policy. Where sections 2-201
and 8-319 are similar, they shall be treated interchangeably.10
Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp. 0
 raises the first
interpretative issue: whether, under the Code, the performance of an act or a
service may constitute "payment" of the contract "price." The plaintiff,
Burnside, alleged that the defendant, Havener Securities Corporation, orally
agreed to assign him one-third of the 25,000 common-stock-purchase warrants
issued to the defendant by the Ormont Drug Company, on the condition that
the plaintiff purchase Ormont stock from a specified third party, Friedman.
Burnside, in a written contract with Friedman, purchased 10,000 shares of
Ormont stock. When the plaintiff confronted Havener, however, the Securities
Corporation denied the contract and refused to transfer the warrants pursuant
to the alleged oral agreement. Burnside sued for breach of contract, alleging
that his purchase of the stock from Friedman was "payment" under section
8-319(b) for the warrants held by Havener, and that, on the basis of this
section, the oral contract was enforceable regardless of the lack of a writing.
To include the alleged contract within section 8-319, the court first
had to determine that the transaction contemplated a sale. Since Code
section 2-106 provides that "[a) 'sale' consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price . . .," the court held that the transaction
was a sale if the transfer was for a price.12 Referring to section 2-304 of the
Code, which states that the "price can be made payable in money or other-
wise," the New York court held that an act, such as Burnside's purchase
of stock from Friedman, could be considered the "price" under the contract."
The Burnside court further stated, however, that since there was no writing
present, the plaintiff's act of payment had to be "unequivocally referable"
to the alleged oral contract in order to render such contract enforceable
under section 8-319(b).14 Since the purchase of stock from Friedman did
not alone evidence the specific alleged contract, the plaintiff's performance
was held not "unequivocally referable" to the alleged agreement, and thus
the contract was held unenforceable due to the lack of a writing. The court
reasoned that if the "unequivocally referable" test were not applied, a
plaintiff could fraudulently assert that any action, on his part, was done in
reliance on a supposed oral contract."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Steuer maintained that Burnside's act
did not constitute "price" and that the transaction, therefore, was not a
"sale."' On this basis he maintained that Burnside did not have to satisfy
section 8-319, dealing with the sale of securities, in order to gain entrance
into court. Even if an act could be construed to constitute "price," asserted
10 Because of the similarities between §§ 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b) it has been
asserted that courts should give a similar construction to both. U.C.C. § 8-319, Comment;
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, § 8-319, Comment (Smith-Hurd 1963); 2 R. Anderson, Uniform
Commercial Code § 8-319:2 (1961).
11 25 App. Div. 2d 373, 269 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1966).
12 Id. at 374-75, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
13 Id. at 375, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
14 Id .
-
15 Id. at 375, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
16 Id. at 376, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
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Justice Steuer, the plaintiff's performance of the required act was "pay-
ment" under section 8-319(b) so as to overcome the defense based on the
lack of a writing.17
 He claimed that whether the plaintiff's performance
evidenced a specific contract was not a question of law to be determined by
the "unequivocally referable" standard set out by the majority. Instead,
the Justice felt that once "payment" has been asserted by the plaintiff, the
defense of the Statute of Frauds should be denied, and the jury should be
allowed to decide whether in the light of other relevant oral testimony, there
was evidence sufficient to prove the contract.
Under pre-Code law, there was a conflict of authorities as to whether
acts called for by such an oral contract could constitute "price." Jurisdictions
which adopted the Uniform Sales Act held, as Justice Steuer suggested, that
"price" must be paid in money or a thing of value, and that an act or service
to be performed under the contract was insufficient." Other courts main-
tained, however, that such acts or services could constitute the contract
price."
The majority in Burnside settled the above dispute by construing the word
"otherwise" in Code section 2-304(1) to include acts, services or any other
consideration sufficient to support a contract.2° That the Code draftsmen
intended "acts and services" to constitute "price" is evidenced by official
comment 1 to section 2-201, which specifically provides that the price may be
payable in services. Various state legislatures and Code reporters have agreed
with Burnside's inclusion of acts and services within the scope of section
2-304(1). 21
Although the Code does allow acts or services to be the agreed price, it
does not state any specific guidelines for determining whether such acts, as
performed, will be sufficient to constitute "payment" and thereby render the
oral contract enforceable. Faced with this problem, the Burnside court turned
to the "unequivocally referable" standard, a test applied in part-performance
cases concerning the sale of real property. In adopting this standard, how-
ever, the court did not elaborate on how the test was to be applied within
the Code. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the court's application of the
"referable" standard in relation to the policy factors underlying the Code's
adoption of a Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds has generally required that contracts be in
writing in order to avoid the enforcement of fraudulently alleged agreements. 22
Inherent in the Statute is the concept that parol testimony is not a reliable
17 Id. at 377, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
18 See cases cited note 3 supra.
19 E.g., Hightower v. Ansley, 126 Ga. 8, 11, 54 S.E. 939, 940 (1906); Osborn v.
Chandeysson Elec. Co., 248 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Mo. 1952). See 2 A. Corbin, Contracts
§ 495, at 671 (1950).
20 25 App. Div. 2d at 375, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
21 See R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code Legal Forms 139 (1963); W. Willier
& F. Hart, Forms and Procedures under the Uniform Commercial Code ill 23.05 (1965);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 5A, § 2-304, Comment (1967); 1 New York Law Revision Commis-
sion Report, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 374 (1955); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
12A, § 2-304, Comment (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 402.304, Comment (1964).
22 See 2 A. Corbin, Contracts § 275 (1950).
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basis for proving a contract. If all plaintiffs alleging oral contracts were
permitted to go before a jury to prove their claims, the determination of
whether a contract existed could rest on the perjured representations of an
asserting plaintiff. This would open the door to fraudulent claims against
innocent parties. It was also felt, however, that performance of the contract
by one of the parties would sufficiently evidence an actual contract to prevent
such fraud, and bar the writing requirement. 23
Not all such alleged performances were considered satisfactory evidence
of a contract to allow exemption from the requirement of a writing. Accord-
ingly, in realty cases, the "unequivocally referable" test evolved. This test
provided that, in order to take the alleged oral contract out of the Statute
of Frauds, such acts as performed must themselves be so clear and definite
in their object as to refer exclusively to the complete agreement. 24
In applying the "unequivocally referable" test to the Code, the Burnside
court cited Burns v. McCormick,25
 the case in which Justice Cardozo enunci-
ated the expression for the first time. In that case a party allegedly promised
to devise his land to the plaintiff if the latter would give up his business and
care for the promisor in his later years. The plaintiff performed the oral
request, and at the promisor's death sued for title to the land, claiming that his
performance excused the contract from the writing requirement of the Statute
of Frauds. Although the act of the plaintiff in caring for the promisor may
have implied some contractual agreement, the court held that the alleged con-
tract was unenforceable, since the performed acts themselves were not "un-
equivocally referable" to a specific alleged contract for the sale of land. 26 The
court would not admit oral testimony in support of the contract, asserting
that this would open the door to perjured claims.27 Thus, under this test, the
performed act itself must evidence the identical contract alleged, and must
permit no other reasonable interpretation.
The trend in realty cases, however, has been away from the Burns rule
toward a less stringent standard.28 A substantial majority of jurisdictions
recognize that it would be manifestly impossible for a performed act, taken
by itself, to evidence exclusively the precise terms of any alleged contract,
and thus satisfy the "unequivocally referable" stanclard. 22 These courts
maintain that the acts need point only to some contractual relationship,
23 See 1 W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 1.1202, at 28 (1964).
24 Bright Radio Laboratories, Inc. v. Coastal Commercial Corp., 4 App. Div. 2d
491, 494, 166 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909-10 (1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 1021, 152 N.E.2d 543, 177
N.Y.S.2d .526 (1958).
25 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922).
28 Id. at 234, 135 N.E. at 274.
27 Id.
28 In fact, New York courts have been paying lip service to the Burns rule while
actually applying a less strict test. E.g., Roberts v. Fulmer, 301 N.Y. 277, 93 N.E.2d
846 (1950), where the court looked not only to the plaintiff's possessing and improving
certain real estate, but also to the circumstances surrounding such acts. The court then
asserted that when viewed against the whole record, the acts of the plaintiff were part
performance "solely and unequivocally referable" to the contract within the Burns
rule. 301 N.Y. at 284, 93 N.E.2d at 849.
29 See Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 960 (1936).
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either in regard to the parties to the suit, or in regard to the subject matter
being sold." Parol evidence may then be introduced in court to show the
precise terms of the alleged contract.
Some jurisdictions have deemphasized the "referable" standard, and deal
primarily with the equitable aspects of part performance. These courts will
not extend the Statute of Frauds to cases in which one party has changed
his position to his detriment in reliance on the oral contract. 34 Courts utiliz-
ing this approach hold that where unjust enrichment or unconscionable injury
would result from the nonenforcement of an oral contract, the defendant is
estopped from invoking the Statute of Frauds as a defense. 32
 The necessity
of protecting against unjust injury and enrichment appears to outweigh the
risk of possible fraudulent allegations. The estoppel is used only to bar the
assertion of the Statute of Frauds: thus the plaintiff's claims are limited to
those which can be proved in court.
Since Code sections 2-201(3) (c) and 8-319(b) do not specify any test
qualifying the term "payment," this provision is susceptible of interpretation
by the states in accordance with their varying standards. Therefore, in keeping
with the Code policy of uniformity 33 it is appropriate to suggest the adoption
of a particular, uniform interpretation consistent with the underlying policy
and intent of the Uniform Commerical Code. An examination of sections
2-201 and 8-319 reveals that the requirements necessary to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds have been lessened considerably. Of special note are the less de-
manding requirements concerning the makeup of a written memorandum.
Under the Uniform Sales Act all the material terms of an agreement had to
be included in the writing for the memorandum to be deemed sufficient evi-
dence of an oral contract. 34
 Under section 2-201 of the Code, however, the
memorandum may be sufficient even though it omits the price, time and
place of payment or delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any particu-
lar warranty." It has been stated that "[a]1l that is required is that the
writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
30
 E.g., Rutt v. Roche, 138 Conn. 605, 608, 87 A.2d 805, 807 (1952) ; Rienzi) v.
Cohen, 112 Conn, 427, 429, 152 A. 394, 395-96 (1930) ; Frizzell v. Frizzell, 149 Va. 815,
823-24, 141 S.E. 868, 870 (1928).
31
 See, e.g., Mosekian v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118, 40 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1964); Buice v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952).
32
 See, e.g., Brewood v. Cook, 92 App. D.C. 386, 389, 207 F.2d 439, 441 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Associated Creditors' Agency v. Haley Land Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 610, 617, 49
Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1966).
as U.C.C. § 1-102(2) states that the qulnderlying purposes and policies of this Act
are • . (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
34
 Uniform Sales Act § 4(1), as construed by the courts, required that all the
material terms of the contract be included in the memorandum. See, e.g., Clinton Mills
Co. v. Sato-Lowell Shops, 3 F.2d 410, 413-14 (1st Cir. 1925), where the time of delivery
was not included in the written memorandum thus rendering the contract unenforceable;
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, 274 Pa. 190, 200-201, 118 A. 109, 113 (1922), where
a memorandum was held insufficient in the absence of a clear statement of the price of
the goods.
" See Committee on Legislative Research, Proposed Uniform Commercial Code: Its
Effect Upon Cognate Missouri Statutes 35 (1954).
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real transaction."" The only necessary items are the signature of the party
against whom enforcement is sought, and the quantity, which may even be
stated incorrectly.37
Section 2-201(2) further liberalizes prior law. Applying to transactions
between merchants,'s this section treats the failure to reply to a written
confirmation as tantamount to the writing required by section 2-201(1).
Under the Uniform Sales Act, the writing requirement would not be satisfied
by such a failure to reply and thus, the alleged oral contract would be unen-
forceable."
It is submitted that this less stringent policy underlying the "writing"
requirements of the Code Statute of Frauds is also applicable to the "pay-
ment" provisions of sections 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b). Thus, if the alleged
act of payment affords a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence
rests upon a real transaction, the asserting party should be given the oppor-
tunity to prove the alleged contract. In conformance with this Code policy
the word "payment" in sections 2-201(3)(c) and 8-319(b) should not be
limited by a requirement that the performance be "unequivocally referable"
to the alleged contract.
The Code's rejection of a "referable" standard is further evidenced by
comment 2 to section 2-201, which states that "[title overt actions of the
parties make admissible evidence of the other terms of the contract .. • ." The
30 Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, 396 Pa. 506, 512,
153 A.2d 472, 476 (1959) ; § 2-201, Comment 1.
37 U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1. The memorandum requirements for § 8-319 differ
slightly from those of § 2-201. Section 8-319(a), while incorporating the overall liberality
of § 2-201(3)(c), states that the memo must also contain a statement of the price. How-
ever, it has been asserted that the statements in the official comments to § 2-201 shall
apply to § 8-319 in all other respects; Cal. Comm. Code § 8319, Comment 1 (West
1964).
38 U.C.C. § 2-104(3) states that " 'Ibletween merchants' means in any transaction
with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of
merchants."
39 E.g., Webster v. Condon, 248 Mass. 269, 271, 142 N.E. 777 (1924) ; Sall v. Mueller
Brass Co., 361 Pa. 449, 452-53, 65 A.2d 236, 237-38 (1949).
The requirements regarding the memorandum in §§ 2-201 and 8-319 are fully con-
sistent with the overall lack of stringency in the Code toward the formation and en-
forcement of contracts. Section 2-204 provides that contracts will not fail for indefinite-
ness as long as there is some reasonable basis for finding an intent to contract. Section
2-207 demonstrates this policy favoring enforcement by providing that an acceptance
which varies the terms of the offer is to be construed as an acceptance, with any addi-
tional terms to be considered as proposals for addition to the original contract. By this
section, the Code adds contractual finality to the situation, whereas under prior law, the
variant acceptance would have been considered a counter-offer, not binding on the
parties. E.g., Snow v. Schulman, 352 Ill. 63, 71, 185 N.E. 262, 266 (1933) ; Cohn v.
Pennsylvania Beverage Co., 313 Pa. 349, 352, 169 A. 768, 769 (1934). Furthermore,
§ 2-305 provides that the parties can make a contract even though no price term is
settled. By pre-Code law, contracts with no price term would be held void for in-
definiteness unless they were requirements contracts. E.g., McNeely v. Bookmyer, 292 Pa.
12, 15, 140 A. 542, 543 (1928). Where an intent to contract is present, the Code supplies
the requisite terms to allow a reasonable enforcement of the agreement. See U.C.C. § 2-308,
where the Code designates the place of delivery if none is provided in the contract;
§ 2-309, where the Code applies a standard of "reasonable time" if the time of delivery
provision is omitted.
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comment goes on to state that "this is true even though the actions of the
parties are not inconsistent with a different transaction such as a consignment
for resale of a mere loan of money." At this point the Code is specifically
rejecting the "referable" test in regard to cash payments of the price. Since,
as noted above, section 2-304 of the Code allows "price" to be payable by the
performance of acts or services called for in the contract, it is evident that
the "referable" standard should also be rejected as to this type of "payment."
Thus, once it is determined that an act or service may constitute "price,"
"payment" of the "price" is merely doing the required act or service. This
is, in effect, the approach used by the courts applying the estoppel concept. 4°
Sections 2-201(3) (c) and 8-319(b), therefore, allow the enforcement of such
oral contracts, if proved, on the basis of statutory law, rather than forcing
the courts to rely on the equitable doctrine of estoppel.
It is thus apparent that the majority in Burnside was correct in stating
that the plaintiff's act of purchasing the stock could constitute "price," but
incorrect in applying the "unequivocally referable" test to the Code Statute
of Frauds. 13urnside's purchase from Friedman was "payment" under section
8-319(b), and he thus was entitled to present oral evidence in an effort to
prove the contract.
IL PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR AN INDIVISIBLE ITEM
A further issue regarding the performance needed to take an oral contract
out of the Statute of Frauds sections of the Code concerns partial payment of
the price under an indivisible contract for sale. There have been two cases
decided under the Uniform Commerical Code on this issue, and they present
contrary interpretations of section 2-201(3) (c). The Pennsylvania case of
Williamson v. Marten involved an oral agreement for the sale of two 200-
gallon milk vats for $800 apiece. The defendant buyer paid $100 on account,
with the remaining $1500 to be paid on the plaintiff seller's delivery of the
vats. Although the plaintiff tendered delivery of the vats, the defendant
refused to accept, denying the existence of an enforceable contract. Williamson
admitted that the value of the goods was more than $500 and that there was
no writing which would render the contract enforceable under section 2-201
(1). He did contend, however, that the defendant's $100 payment brought
the contract within the scope of section 2-201(3) (c), thereby rendering the
contract enforceable.
The court held that since the $100 payment was less than the price of
one vat, section 2-201(3) (c) did not apply to exempt the contract from the
application of section 2-201(1). 42 The Uniform Sales Act provision that par-
tial payment of the contract price takes the entire contract out of the Statute
of Frauds was held repealed by the Code. 43 Under section 2-201(3) (c), a
partial payment allows an oral contract to be enforceable, "with respect to
goods for which payment has been made and accepted." 44 On the basis of
40 See text p. 360 supra.
41 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (Northumberland County Ct. 1956).
42 Id. at 35.
4s Id .
44 Id.
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this change, the Williamson court asserted that the Code denied the enforce-
ment of an oral agreement where in the case of a single, indivisible object,
the payment made is not the full amount 45
In Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc." a New York court reached an opposite
result. In this case the plaintiff allegedly made a $25 down payment to the
defendant car dealer on an oral contract for the sale of an automobile. On the
day the car was to be delivered, the defendant demanded an additional $175.
Starr refused to pay the increased price and sued for breach of contract. The
dealer claimed there was no enforceable contract, however, since the writing
requirement was not satisfied in accordance with section 2-201(1).
Ruling that the $25 payment was sufficient to make the oral contract
enforceable under section 2-201(3) (c), the court specifically rejected the
Williamson decision:17 The Starr court maintained that even if subparagraph
(c) validates a divisible contract for only as much of the goods as have been
paid for, it does not necessarily follow that such a rule invalidates an indivis-
ible oral contract where some part of the agreed price has been paid and
accepted.48
 The court felt that any other decision would render unconscionable
results by denying the enforcement of contracts actually made in good faith. 4°
This would encourage rather than discourage fraud since a deceitful seller
would be able to deny any oral contract where there has been part payment
for an indivisible item. Furthermore, the court stated that the $25 deposit
was certainly not intended to be for the purchase of a portion of a car, but
was intended to be towards the purchase of the entire automobile. 5 °
When a case deals with divisible, apportionable goods, the Code remedy
is clear with respect to partial payment. Delivery may be demanded only
for the quantity of goods evidenced by the amount of payment. The problem
arises when part payment of the alleged contract price is made on an indivis-
ible item as in the Williamson and Starr cases. The solution to this problem
lies in an understanding of the policy behind the adoption of section 2-201-
(3)(c).
Under the Uniform Sales Act once part payment was established, the
entire alleged contract was taken out of the Statute of Frauds, and a plain-
tiff was given the opportunity to prove an agreement for a larger quantity of
goods than the payment implied.51 Although the partial payment provision
of the Uniform Sales Act assured the enforceability of contracts in fact made,
it also opened the door to false claims of contracts for greater quantities than
46 Id.
46 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
4T Id. at 61.
48 Id. In this regard, it is relevant to note the language of U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment
2 which states that, "[i]f the court can make a just apportionment, • . . the seller can
be forced to deliver an apportionable part of the goods." This statement plainly allows
the enforceability of divisible contracts with respect to the amount of payment. However,
the comment, like § 2-201 itself, does not explicitly deny the enforcement of indivisible
contracts. To read the latter into the comment without an understanding of the overall
policy of the Uniform Commercial Code is misleading.
49 282 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
50 Id.
61 See cases cited note 7 supra.
363
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
actually agreed upon. For example, suppose a plaintiff buyer made a $5000
payment to the defendant seller and alleged that this was a partial payment
under an oral contract for the sale of $10,000 worth of goods. By the Uniform
Sales Act, a court would hold that the $5000 payment sufficiently evidenced
a contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The court would then allow the
plaintiff to attempt to prove the larger quantity in court. Assume, however,
that the actual oral agreement had been for $5000 worth of goods. By allowing
the plaintiff to assert a contract for more, the court would provide him with
an opportunity to fraudulently claim a larger quantity. Thus, the basic policy
behind the Statute of Frauds of protecting against the enforcement of fraudu-
lent contracts would be defeated.
To protect against the assertion of a quantity larger than that actually
agreed upon, the Code draftsmen included sections 2-201(3) (c) and 8-319-
(b).52
 These sections, like the Uniform Sales Act, admit that a partial pay-
ment sufficiently evidences an oral contract to protect against the wholly
feigned allegation of a contractual reIationship. 52 Sections 2-201(3) (c) and
8-319(b) limit the enforceable quantity of the alleged contract, however, to
that amount actually evidenced by the payment. 54
Relying on the principle behind the change from prior law in these
sections, the Williamson court, in essence, held that a partial payment with
regard to an oral indivisible contract would not provide a sufficient quantity
limitation to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 55 The Code's provision for a quan-
tity term, however, was not meant to be so restrictive as to bar the enforce-
ment of oral indivisible contracts in these cases. This becomes apparent after
a review of the possibilities of fraud in conjunction with Code policy under
both the Williamson and Starr interpretations. Williamson protects completely
against the false assertions of quantity exemplified in the hypothetical case.
By utilizing this approach with indivisible contracts, however, Williamson
permits a seller falsely to deny the existence of any contract. Thus, the in-
equity which Williamson permits is greater than the inequity it supposedly
protects against. If the contract is declared unenforceable, the decision is
final, leaving an innocent party who relied on the oral contract with no
opportunity to prove the contract. By the Starr approach, however, section
2-201 is satisfied and the parties may present evidence as to the reality of
the contract. Since, in order to render the contract enforceable, the asserting
party still must prove the terms of the alleged contract, some protection
against fraudulent assertions is provided and, at the same time, the potential
inequity of the Williamson result is avoided.
The Starr decision is in accord with the general policy of sections 2-201
and 8-319 in that it allows contracts, if proved, to be enforceable where there
has been "a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real
transaction." 56
 As noted earlier, the Code's Statute of Frauds sections are
52 See 1 W. Hawiciand, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 1.1202, at 28 (1964).
53 Connecticut Temporary Commission to Study and Report upon, the Uniform
Commercial Code, Study and Report 70 (1959).
54 See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1.
Utc 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 35.
56
	§ 2-201, Comment 1.
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considerably less demanding than prior law. While seeking to carry out the
contractual intent of the parties, these sections reject many of the strict
requirements which previously prevented the enforcement of actual agree-
ments, such as the former limitation that the memorandum contain a state-
ment of the time and place of payment or delivery. 51 In addition, the general
Code policy of substituting commercially reasonable terms where they have
been omitted from a written contract also supports the Starr decision. This
policy implies that the Code takes the risk of substituting terms different
from those actually agreed upon in order to protect against the possibility
of an innocent party, who relies on the agreement, being injured by its nonen-
forcement. Similarly, the Starr rationale implies that the risk of injury to a
party who relies on the contract outweighs the possibility of any fraud which
may result from denying the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
The Starr approach finds further support in an examination of Code
policy concerning the enforceability under section 2-201(3) (c) of contracts
for goods which have been "received and accepted." Section 2-201(3) (c)
refers specifically to section 2-606 which defines the term "acceptance." Sec-
tion 2-606(2) states that "acceptance of the part of any commercial unit is
acceptance of that entire unit."
A hypothetical situation best expresses the relevance of this section to
section 2-201(3) (c). Suppose a seller orally contracts with a buyer for the
sale of a machine which is considered a "commercial unit." 58 The machine
being too large for a single delivery, the seller ships the unit in parts. After
accepting one half of the parts, the buyer denies that the contract was for a
larger quantity of goods. Under section 2-201(3) (c), the contract is enforce-
able with respect to "goods which have been received and accepted." It
would appear on the basis of this section that the seller could not assert a
contract for a larger quantity, and the buyer would have to pay a price appor-
tionable to the quantity accepted. Section 2-201(3) (c), however, is modified
by section 2-606(2). The latter section recognizes the validity of partial
acceptance, but asserts that the buyer may exercise this right only as to whole
"commercial units."58 Thus, in the hypothetical case, if the contract were
proved, the buyer would have to accept the rest of the machine parts.
In "commercial unit" situations, the Code is manifesting a policy which
allows the seller to enforce, if proved, a contract for a quantity greater than
that actually accepted. Similarly, in situations involving payment of the con-
tract price for a "commercial unit," this Code policy would dictate that the
defense of the Statute of Frauds be held inapplicable and that the buyer be
afforded an opportunity to prove that the alleged contract was for that "com-
mercial unit." Thus, in the Williamson case, the contract should have been
57 See note 39 supra.
Sa U.C.C. § 2-105(6) states:
"Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a
single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its
character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single
article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment
of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated
in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.
59 U.C.C. § 2-606, Comment 5.
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held enforceable for one vat,e° which, under the definition in section 2-105-
(6), is obviously a "commercial unit." Also, in the Starr case, the contract
for the automobile should have been held enforceable.
The Burnside and Starr cases have presented significant issues concerning
the enforceability of oral sales contracts under the Code. With respect to
Burnside, it is evident that the court was correct in holding that an act or a
service could constitute "price" under section 2-304. It is submitted, however,
that the court was incorrect in holding that the performance of such acts
must be "unequivocally referable" to the specific alleged contract in order
to render the oral contract enforceable. The policy underlying the Code
Statute of Frauds merely requires that the performance provide a basis for
the presentation of evidence in proof of the contract.
It is also evident that the Starr decision was correct in holding that oral
sales contracts are enforceable where partial payment has been made for an
indivisible item. This decision eliminates the possible inequity inherent in
Williamson in which a seller could falsely deny an agreement that was actually
concluded, and thus furthers the Code policy toward less demanding condi-
tions for the enforcement of contracts. By utilizing the "commercial unit"
concept in conjunction with Starr, moreover, a party would not be able to
allege a contract for a larger amount than the partial payment evidenced.
GAILY S. FENTIN
00 See 1 W. Hawkland, supra note 52, at 29.
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